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SUMMARY OF OPINIONS OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL*
In the statement of editorial policy of the first issue of the Miami Law
Quarterly it was set down that, "Law is not a static thing and it is the hope
of the editors of the Quarterly that it will not only provide accurate dis-
cussiofis and analyses of the law as it now exists, but will also make some
contribution toward the orderly and progressive development of our system
of law to meet changing economic and social conditions." The Attorney
General's opinions presented here are merely an outgrowth of that policy.
The Attorney General is required by law' to give opinions on legal
matters to certain public officials when requested by them. The questions
that arise generally concern statutes which have not been previously con-
strued. The answers are advisory and many times in the form of prediction.
It is with these predictions that the very purpose of this section arises. Our
hope, in presenting the interpretations by the Attorney General, is that the
practicing attorney may find some practical assistance through this addition-
al source of statutory construction.
CONSTABLES. Appointment of deputy. There is no common law or statutory
provision for a constable to appoint a permanent deputy, although he may
summon such persons as he may need to make a lawful arrest.2
Arrest of non-resident operating motor vehicle with foreign registration.3
While a constable may make arrests within his territorial district, any doubts
as to whether the offense justifies arrest with or without a warrant should
be resolved by first obtaining a warrant.4 It is doubtful that violation of the
statute5 concerning operation of a motor vehicle with non-resident regis-
tration would constitute such a breach of the peace as to justify arrest with-
out a warrant.
CORPORATIONS. Refund of filing fee. The fee required by statuteO at the
time of filing certificate of incorporation is not refundable even though the
corporation is dissolved prior to doing business.7 While this may not be an
*This issue covers selected opinions from Jan. 1, 1951 to March 27, 1951. Ops.
Att'y Gen. 051-1 - 051-66, omitting Ops. Att'y Gen. 051-2, 051-7, 051-10, 051-14, 051-17,
051-23, 051-27, 051-30, 051-39, 051-41, 051-42, 051-44, 051-45, 051-49, 051-58, 051-63,
051-66.
The Summary of Opinions was prepared for publication by Howard A. Meyers and
William R. Neblett,
1. FLA. STAT. § 16.01 (1949).
2. Op. Arr'y CEN. 051-53 (March 12, 1951); FLA. STAT. § 901.18 (1949); 1945.
46 BIENNIAL REP. 147.
3. See MOTOR VEHICLES, infra.
4. Or. A-r'y GEN. 051-53, supra note 2.
5. FLA. STAT. § 320.38 (1949).
6. FLA. STAT. § 612.58 (1949).
7. O. ATT'Y GEN. 051-20 (Jan. 22, 1951).
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equitable solution, the comptroller cannot pay out funds in the absence of
an enabling statute.
COUNTIES. Attorney's fees. A county tax assessor who stuck to his guns in
the face of illegal reduction of an assessment by the Board of County Com-
missioners, incurring legal fees in the process of an appeal to the Supreme
Court, may have such legal fees paid from the excess fees of his office at his
disposal, if any, or by the Board of County Commissioners. Since the county
attorney, in the situation presented to the Attorney General, had repre-
sented the Commissioners, it was necessary for the tax assessor to obtain
different counsel. The assessor's determined stand resulted in a benefit to
the county, in the collection of higher taxes. In the instant case, the Board
of County Commissioners has agreed to pay the legal fees, provided there
is no legal prohibition against it, so the question of what recourse the as-
sessor would have, if the Board refused so to do, and the fees of the asses-
sor's office were insufficient, is not decided.
Appointment of relatives by county commissioner. It is unlawful for a
county commissioner to appoint a relative to any position when such person
is within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.9
Compensation of officials on fee basis. While concerned primarily
with the compensation of two county officials in one county, recent opin-
ions reach some interesting general conclusions.' 0 Minimun salary of such
officials is usually fixed by special acts, however, a statute'' prescribes an
upper limit on net income. It appears that the minimum salary is considered
compensation only for the performance of the usual and ordinary functions
of the office. If additional duties are performed, additional compensation
may be paid from the general revenue fund of the county, not to exceed the
upper limit. The Attorney General notes that there has been departmental
construction of some of the previous laws, which rulings are of persuasive
force, especially since the legislature has made no effort to counteract them
in subsequent legislation.
Duty of county commissioners to insure. Adhering to the doctrine that
county commissioners have no power other than those enumerated by
statute or necessarily implied to further an express power,' 2 the Attorney
General found' 3 sufficient implication to protect public property by insur-
ance deriving from the broader power to maintain bridges.
Effect of census on population statutes. Since the Florida Constitution
provides' 4 that the federal census shall control in all population acts, inter-
8. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-8 (Jan. 11, 1951)_
9. Op. ATr'Y, G N. 051-62 (March 26, 1951).
10. Op. A-r'y GEN. 051-22 (Jan. 30, 1951); Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-32 (Feb. 16,
1951); Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-51 (March 14, 1951).
11. FLA. STAT. § 145.01 et seq. (1949).
12. Crandon v. Hazlett, 157 Fla. 574, 26 So.2d 638 (1946); Gessner v. Del-Air
Corp., 154 Fla. 829, 17 So.2d 522 (1944).
13. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-5 (Jan. 11, 1951).
14. FLA. CONST. Art. VII, § 5.
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esting questions arise due to the rapid growth of the state. In two recent
opinions'5 the Attorney General reaches the conclusion that the effective
date of changes brought about by the federal census in many instances is as
of April 1, 1950. More difficult is the matter of deciding whether the pre-
liminary count, released October 9, 1950, is sufficient authority to effect
the retroactive changes. Since census procedure includes such a preliminary
report about six months after actual count, although final official tabulation
may not be forthcoming for an additional six months, the difference in the
two is usually minor, the final tabulation being usually slightly in excess of
the preliminary report. It is further considered that the announcement made
by the Bureau of the Census is an official announcement, which may be
relied upon.
Employment of jailer and servant by sheriff. \While there appears to be
no legal prohibition against employing one person both as jailer and servant,
such a practice is against the established custom in the state, as both posi-
tions are considered to be full time ones.'6
Leave of absence for military senice. Authority to grant leaves of ab-
sence to county or state officials under the statute 7 extends only to those
officials serving in the military forces, and would not be applicable in the
case of a county commissioner employed as a civilian on a military air base
in North Africa.'8
-Taxing districts-Port Authority. Port Authority and other taxing dis-
trict bonds are not municipal bonds, and should not be received, under the
statute,' as security for the safekeeping and prompt payment of county
funds on deposit with county depositories. 2"1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. County judge's courts. While one provision of the
statutes 2' says that the criminal procedure law shall govern procedure in all
cases, another statute22 makes specific provisions for justice of the peace
procedures to regulate proceedings of county judges in criminal cases. The
Attorney General feels23 that in the case of conflict, the specific provisions
should control.
Default of payment on bond. An individual in default of payment of
a fine and cost bond imposed by a county judge's court may still be reached
with the same papers in another Florida county. 24 Although the commit-
15. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-4 (Jan. 10, 1951); Op. A'r'Y GEN. 051-36 (March 1,
1951).
16. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-1 (Ian. 2, 1951).
17. FL&. STAT. § 115.08 (1949).
18. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-64 (March 26, 1951).
19. FLA. STAT. § 136.01 (1949).
20. Op. ATT'Y GE. 051-65 (March 27, 1951).
21. Fr-A. STAT. § 925.02 (1949).
22. FLA. STAT. § 937.01 (1949). -
23. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-60 (March 22, 1951).
24. Op. ATT'Y. GF . 051-46 March 7, 1951).
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ment is addressed to the sheriff of the county in which the fine was imposed,
it has full force and effect throughout the state.25
Use of municipal jail by county. There is no obligation on the part of
a municipality to allow the county to use municipal jail facilities. However,
the municipality may enter into such a lease agreement with the county, per-
mitting use of a portion of its jail for agreed fees. Normally, county prisoners
would remain under the custody of a deputy sheriff or county jailer. If an
agreement contained provisions for the municipal jailer to receive county
prisoners, the Attorney General advises26 that proper commitment papers
accompany each prisoner so received, to comply with the requirement that
persons arrested should have been taken before a proper magistrate, and
complaint made, with opportunity for bail. This would guard the municipal-
ity against suits for false imprisonment.'
ELECTIONS. Qualifications of voters. Under the statute27 as construed by the
Attorney General,28 only voters who were qualified to vote in the primary
elections and remain so qualified may vote in special elections for state sen-
ators and representatives.
Qualification of voters - civil rights. A person convicted in federal
court of a felony under a federal statute loses his civil rights and may not
vote, testify as a witness, or serve as a juror in Florida, until such rights are
restored.2 9 The constitution3" and enabling statutes"1 speak both of "fel-
onies" and of "infamous crimes," terms which the Supreme Court considers
practically synonymous.32  These terms do not, however, include mis-
demeanors, so in the event of conviction by federal statute, it is necessary
to determine whether the offense is classified as a felony or a misdemeanor.
A previous opinion,331 following the same rationale, discussed a case of con-
viction in federal court of embezzlement, finding this offense to be a mis-
demeanor by statute, and a sentence of five years in a federal penitentiary
did not deprive the person convicted of his civil rights.
Salary of the supervisor of registration. When the salary of the super-
visor of registration of a county is fixed by special law, he may not draw ad-
ditional compensation as custodian of voting machines.3 4 The latest law351
provides that the supervisor shall be the custodian of voting machines, and
is construed to supersede an earlier law, otherwise still in force,38 providing
25. FLA. STAT, § 932.01, 932.02 (1949).
26. Op. Arr'y GN. 051-12 (Jan. 12, 1951).
27. FLA. STAT. § 98.09 (1949).
28. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-28 (Feb. 7, 1951).
29. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-56 (March 16, 1951).
30. HFA. CONST. Art. 6, §§ 4, 5 and Art. 16, § 25.
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 98.01(4), 98.01(5) (1949).
32. Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731 (1937).
33. 1945-46 BIENNIAL REP. 771.
34. Op. ATr'y GEN. 051-13 (Jan. 18, 1951).
35. FLA. STAT. § 100.42 (1949).
36. FLA. STAT. § 100.10 (1949).
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for authorities in charge of elections to employ "custodians" of voting
machines.
Write-in ballots. Although the right of electors to use write-in votes is
guaranteed in general elections 7 this does not apply in primary elections. 8
The purpose of primary elections is entirely different. Under control of the
state, primary elections are political party elections affording party candidates
the opportunity of nomination for public office.30
EDUCATION. Exceptional children. Indicating the well directed emphasis
on education, a recent opinion 40 liberally construes two statutes41 to author-
ize a county to take over and operate a school for mentally and physically re-
tarded children. Although it appears that the legislature may have intended
state control, and that strict classification of "exceptional children" and the
qualifications for their teachers is set forth in the statutes, 42 this is construed
to apply only when state funds are involved. When county funds alone are
used, the Attorney General recommends, as a matter of sound policy, that
the county be guided by general provisions applicable to qualified teachers,
and calls attention to limitations on the age of children eligible for instruc-
tion in public schools.
Federal grants. The State Department of Education is. the only agency
authorized to apply for and administer federal funds provided for school
building surveys and school construction. The State Treasurer disburses
such funds.'8
Construction contracts obtained by bribes. Several architects admitted
before a grand jury that construction contracts they had received from a
school board were obtained through bribery. The problem facing the At-
torney General was the determination of the status of such contracts. The
conclusion 44 was that the contract was merely voidable. If the school board
elected to enforce the contract, it could do so, but the right to void it does
exist although, solely on the part of the board.
HoMs'R Sm EXEMPTIoNs. Husband and wife living apart. In a well-reasoned
opinion 45 the Attorney General concludes that where a wife has established,
,in good faith, a permanent home separate from her husband, there is no
constitutional bar ' to the granting of homestead exemptions both to the
husband and to the wife, where each meet the requirements. It is still up to
the Tax Assessor to determine whether the wife has just grounds for estab-
lishing such separate residence, the apparent limitations being separate legal
residence for the purpose of divorce, or separate maintenance.
37. FLA. STAT. §§ 99.18, 100.18 (1949).
38. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 051-57 (March 16, 1951).
39. FLA. STAT. § 102.01 et seq. (1949).
40. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-37 (Feb. 27, 1951).
41. FLA. STAT. §§ 230.44, 236.61 (1949).
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 236.61, 236.62 (1949).
43. Or. Arr'Y GEN. 051-40 (Feb. 28, 1951).
44. Op. ArT'Y GE.M. 051-43 (March 1, 1951).
45. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-34 (Feb. 21, 1951).
46. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 7.
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INSURANCE. 47 Hospital service plans. A recent opinion 48 concludes that a
hospital service corporation operating undcr Florida law 49 may legally con-
tract for the payment of hospital services where the hospital is owned and
operated by osteopathic physicians and surgeons. 'While citing a previous
opinion the present Attorney General does not discuss the services as
physicians and surgeons of such osteopaths, although the older opinion10
could find nothing in the statute" to limit such mcdical and surgical services
to duly licensed doctors of medicine.
JUDGrEs. Disqualification. Participation in preparation of cases as an assistant
in the County Solicitor's office is sufficient to disqualify the assistant from
trying these same cases when lie was subsequently appointed as judge of the
Criminal Court of Record.52
Executive officer of Justice of the Peace Court. The executive office of
the justice of the Peace Court may be either the sheriff, sheriff's deputy, or
a constable.55  However, there is only one fee payable for this duty,5 4 so
that if more than one officer is present in court, the Justice of the Peace
must designate the one who is to discharge the duty. Statutes55 appear to
require that when the Justice of the Peace acts as coroner, the warrant to
impanel a jury is directed to the constable, although warrants for arrest '
are directed "to any lawful officer of said county."
Justice of the Peace. The county nmay not pay the office rent for a
Justice of the Peace, but lie may maintain an office and pay for it from fees
accruing to his office.58
MOTOR VEICLES. Non-residents. Permission to use motor vehicles regis-
tered in other states ceascs under the statute when the owner's child enrolls
in a public school, or when the owner is employed within the state. Florida
registration is then required, whether the vehicle be owned by the individual
or by someone in his family. 60 Vhere the vehicle is owned by a third party,
and loaned to the individual, foreign registration is permissible if the owner
meets statutory conditions, however, if the owner is a non-resident, or a
scheme to defraud the state appears, then Florida registration is required."'
Liability insurance - boats. The provisions of a statute62 providing for.
insurance of motor vehicles may be lawfully extended to include motorboats
47. See MOTOR VEHICLES, infra.
48. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-16 (Ian. 16, 1951).
49. FLA. STAT. § 641.01 at seq. (1949).
50. 1947-48 BIENNIAL REP. 562.
51. FLA. STAT. § 641.01(l) (1949).
52. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-25 (Feb. 2, 1951).
53. FLA. STAT. § 37.16 (1949).
54. FLA. STAT. § 30.23 (1949).
55. FLA. STAT. §§ 936.03, 936.19 (1949).
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 936.15, 936.22 (1949).
57. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 051-15 (Ian. 16, 1951).
58. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-26 (Feb. 5, 1951).
59. . STAT. § 320.37 (194-9).
60. OL. ATT'Y GEN. 051-45 (march 2, 1951).
61. See CONSTABLES, supa.
62. FLA. STAT. § 243.022 (1949).
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which are the property of the Educational Board of Control and used under
its supervision. However, the insurer may not plead governmental immunity
except as to the amount of a claim in excess of the insurance coverage for
personal and property damage, as the purpose of the statute is to permit
claims to be paid up to the amount of this coverage onlyY3
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION S. Express grants. The power of a city to acquire
property within or outside the city limits, specifically authorized by the city
charter, is an express grant 0 4
Redevelopment projects. Redevelopment projects of a city may be ex-
tended to areas outside the city limits, but within a reasonable distance."'
PUBLIC I-IEALTH. Tuberculosis. The state looks to the county for payment
when the county sends tubercular indigents to state hospitals, so that if it is
found that the person is able to pay it is up to the county to reimburse itself
by arrangements with the individual. While compulsory confinement is
provided for in the statute 7 the procedure for collection from the patient
is not, so it may be that the county's only recourse, after appropriate investi-
gations of the individual's resources, would be to withdraw its financial sup-
port. Even this procedure may not be available to the county if the statute
is construed to the effect that the county is obligated to pay for all of its
patients. NWhile the legislature may not have intended to provide free treat-
ment for those able to pay, it did set forth provisions for compulsory com-
mitment to hospitalization without correlative provisions for collecting pay-
ment from such persons.
PUBLIC OFFICERS. Purchases. The fact that one member of a school board
is the wife of the president of a corporation from which the board purchases
supplies is not evidence of the wife's interest in the business of the corpor-
ation.68 Unless the wife, herself, owned stock in the corporation, she could
not be said to have such a direct or indirect interest as would bring her within
the prohibition of the statute" and bar her from voting to approve bills for
payment.
SECURITIES. Capitalization. Finding at least two types of capital possible
in a corporation organized under Florida laws70 the Attorney General con-
eluded7' that no registration with the securities commission is necessary as
long as the total of the issued and outstanding stock sold does not exceed
$10,000, and the resulting number of shareholders does not exceed twenty.72
Registration. Whether the registration of securities is accomplished
completely by the act of filing with the securities commission, or whether
63. Op. An-'Y GEN. 051-19 (Jan. 22, 1951).
64. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-61 (March 27, 1951).
65. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 051-59 (March 20, 1951).
66. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-21 (Jan. 29, 1951).
67. FLA. STAT. §§ 392.17, 392.18 (1949).
68. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-52 (March 14, 1951).
69. FLA. STAT. § 839.09 (1949).
70. FLA. STAT. § 612.01 et. seq. (1949).
71. OP. ATT'Y GEN. 051-6 (1an. 11, 1951).
72. FLA. STAT. § 517.06 (1949).
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registration is not complete until action by the commission may depend
upon the type of security and its classification tinder one of two sections
of the statute.73 It appears that the legislature contemplated automatic
registration by filing in the case of special classes of presumably sound secur-
ities, to expedite the free flow of commerce, but an assumption that the
commission must accept all securities filed, without investigA'tion, is obviously
unsound,' 4 as this would reduce the commission to a recording agency, and
prevent one of its major purposes, the protection of the public, from being
carried out.
STATE FLAGS AND INS[GNIA. Replicas. There is no prohibition in the state
constitution or statutes which would bar the sale by a charitable organization
of replicas of the Great Seal of the state, or of state or United States flags 5
STATE WARRATS. Non-negotiable. A state warrant is a non-negotiable
instrument, therefore a thief does not pass title, and the person from whom
it was stolen, unless estopped by negligence, still has legal title to the war-
rant2'
TAXATION. Cancellation of tax sale certificates. The law 7 which provided
for cancellation of tax sale certificates issued prior to 1940 applies only to
private holders of such certificates, and municipalities may not use this
authority to cancel such certificates.'8
Cigarette tax. The purpose of the cigarette tax'" was to provide an
actual reduction in the overall millage of the county, so that an actual sav-
ing to taxpayers would result. Therefore, to be eligible to receive such funds,
the county must effect a bona fide reduction in ad valorem operating taxes,
and may not, while reducing the operating millage, at the same time raise
the debt service millage beyond debt service requirements.80
Exemptions of church property. The exemption of church property
from taxation may be for the reason of use for religious purposes81 or may
be considered under another provision of the constitution8 2 if the church is
incorporated, as an exception to taxation of corporate property. The latter
extends the exemption beyond the actual church building, parsonage, and
burial grounds to property "held and used exclusively for religious purposes."
Thus, where a church owns an undivided one-third interest in a lot, the
other two-thirds being owned by individuals, whether the church's interest
is taxable depends upon whether the property is used. If the lot is vacant
73. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.08 or 517.09 (1949).
74. Or. ATT'Y GEN. 051-24 (Feb. 1, 1951).
75. Op. ATT'Y GEN, 051-47 (March 8, 1951).
76. Or. ATT'Y G., 051-54 (March 14, 1951).
77. FLA. STAT. § 194.59 (1949).
78. Or. ATT' GEM. 051-11 (Jan. 11, 1951).
79. FLA. STAT. § 210.21(e) (1949).
80. Or. ATr'Y GEN. 051-18 (Jan. 19, 1951).
81. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 1.
82. FLA. CONST. Art. XVI, § 16.
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and unused, the church must pay taxes. If it is used for religious purposes,
the church is not liable for its undivided interest. 3
Income tax. With an eye on various decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court,84 which has been careful to guard against tax schemes which in effect
violate constitutional provisions,85 the Attorney General classifies as "highly
controversial" a proposed act to levy a tax on employees which would, in
cffect, require a compulsory health and accident insurance for them. 0 It is
conceded that a respectable argument can be made in favor of such a scheme,
under the state's police power in general welfare, or as an excise tax for the
privilege of engaging in business. At least one other state has held a similar
tax on employees not to offend the constitutional bar against income taxes,87
but a prediction as to our own state Supreme Court's reaction would be en-
tirely speculative. Only the passage of such legislation, and a court test
could decide the matter.
Inheritance and estate taxes - reciprocity. There can be no reciprocity
in the matter of estate and inheritance taxes between Indiana and Florida,
as Indiana levies an inheritance or estate tax against intangible personal
property of a non-resident decedent, when such property has a business situs
in Indiana. Florida does not have a similar tax8  as the two sections of the
statute 8 9 which apply do not mention intangible personal property of non-
resident decedents.
Rental of race track equipment. Under a lease agreement a Florida
corporation furnishes race tracks computing machines, starting gates and
photographic service. The question arose whether the fees paid were rental
or service fees, and whether they were taxable under the appropriate
statute.90 The Attorney General found"1 that the agreements providing for
starting gates and photo finishes were clearly service contracts, and not con-
tracts for the rental of equipment, as control and operation of the equip-
ment involved was entirely in the corporation, the track furnishing only a
camera room, water and electricity. However, the computers, or "totalisors,"
are operated by race track employees. There being doubt as to whether this
particular agreement was a service or a rental contract, the Attorney General
suggested that it be treated as a rental agreement until the courts should do.
termine otherwise. This will have the effect of making the totalisor
machine arrangement subject to tax."2
83. Or. ATT'Y GEN. 051-38 (Feb. 27, 1951).
84. Mahan v. Lummus, 160 Fla, 564, 33 So.2d 725 (1948); Owen v. Fosdick,
153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (1943); State ex rel. McKay v. Keller, 140 Fla. 346 (1939);
State ex rel Kurz v. Lee, 163 So. 859 (Fla. 1935).
85. FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 11.
86. O'. ATT'y GEN. 051-50 (Narch 9, 1951).
87, Beeland Wholesale Co, v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516 (Ala. 1937).
88. Op. ATT'Y GN. 051-35 (Feb. 21, 1951).
89. FLA. STATr. §§ 198.02, 198.03 (1949).
90. FLA. STAT. § 212.01 et seq. (1949).
91. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-55 (March 15, 1951).
92. FLA. STAT. § 212.02(e) (1949).
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Sales by non-resident firms. A foreign corporation which accepts orders
from Florida residents and then delivers tangible personal property to the
purchaser in this state, using the corporation's own motor vehicles, may have
those vehicles seized under the statute93 if it does not collect the use tax
imposed by the state.04 The fact that the corporation is not licensed to do
business in Florida does not prevent it from engaging in such interstate
commerce, however, its frequent deliveries to residents indicate that it is,
in fact, doing business in the state. flie theory of this type of taxation is
that one may not tax transactions in interstate commerce, but a use tax
may be imposed upon an article after it has come to rest in the state, if it
does not continue in interstate commerce. The tax is not levied on the
seller, but on the consumer, but under Florida law the seller is required
to collect the tax.
The rationale of the opinion 5 includes an argument that since the
foreign corporation operates in a state where the Uniform Sales Act is in
effect, the "property does not pass until the goods have been delivered"
because the seller is required to deliver the goods or to pay the freight.96
This argument appears weak in the light of interpretations of the Act which
indicate that the sale is made, title passing, at the seller's place of business,
the seller rarely being found to actually absorb the cost of freight. Title
may even pass where payment by the buyer has not yet been made, the seller
retaining only such an interest in the property to protect the purchase
money, and title being said to "revest" if the condition of payment is not
met. However, the control exercised by the seller in delivering the property
in its own vehicles rather than by common carrier may be sufficient to infer
a retention of title in the seller, if coupled by an agreement in the sales
contract that goods are at the seller's risk until actual delivery to the buyer
at a particular address.
The opinion 7 admits doubt, but reaches the conclusion that there is
sufficient authority to attempt to collect the taxes by seizing the corpora-
tion's vehicles.
Veteran's exemption from license taxes. A disabled veteran who oper-
ates his own barber shop is entitled to a municipal exemption of $50.00.91
Where the rate of the municipal license is predicated on a basis of $5.00 per
chair, this does not mean that the exemption is limited to the particular
chair which seats the veteran's personal customers, but extends to the chairs
of his employees. 9
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Street risks. Continuing a liberal policy with
regard to compensation, and noting that other states are doing likewise, the
93, FLA. STAT. § 212.16 (1949).
94. OF. ATT'Y GEN. 051-31 (Feb. 16, 1951).
95. Ibid.
96. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 19, rule 5.
97. See note 94 sup~ra.
98. FtA. STAT. § 205.16 (1949).99, Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-48 (March 8, 1951).
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Attorney General advises the Commission'"0 that compensation inay be
paid to an employee on the streets of a city, in the performance of his
duties, if he is injured by a stray rifle bullet. Two requirements of the
statute, that the injury "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment, 01
must be met, It is not so difficult to find an employce "in the course of
employment" as long as he is performing some task for the employer, but it
does require liberality to hold "street risk" injuries to'have causal connection
with the employment. The new rationale appears to have been established
by the California court1 '2 which theorizes that had the employee not been
where he was in the course of his duties, he would not have been injured.
100. Op. ATT'Y GEN, 051-29 (Feb. 9, 1951).
101. FLA. STAT. § 440-09 (1949).
102. Industrial Indemnity Co. v, Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 443, 214
P.2d 41 (1950).
